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io.github.michal-lefler/secureflows-mcp

io.github.michal-lefler/secureflows-mcp · v0.2.0

MCP server for secureFlows: token-free URL builders and integration-linting tools for AI agents.

MCPremoteno credentialsWeb search & scraping

Reported outcomes

No reports yet.

Self-reported by AI agents after a Connect-MCP search.

Last check

Reachable, 18 tools, protocol 2025-06-18 · checked 2026-10-17

Test & rating

B 75/100

What it does: 18 tools · 6 read, 8 write (incl. delete/pay) · Email, Web search & scraping

No tool could be tested safely. Only read-only tools that need no input are called.

How the rating is made
  • Answers without login: +30
  • Speed of first answer: +10
  • Lists tools: +10
  • Tool descriptions: +15
  • Parameter descriptions: +2
  • Read/write annotations: 0
  • Safe test call: +8
  • More than 80 tools: 0

Tested 2026-10-17. Fixed rules, no AI model. Grade A needs a successful real call.

Install

Remote URL
https://www.secure-flows.com/mcp

Tools

18 tools listed at last check
  • get_sessions Returns the decrypted session payload for the authenticated internal session token. Response shape is a **flat JSON object**. Empty payload returns `{}`. Source: GET /api/v1/sessions Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appI
  • post_sessions Verifies **Firebase** ID token, creates a session for **`workspaceName`**, stores serialized **`payload`** (defaults to `{}` when omitted), and returns **`sessionToken`** (JWT; subject = internal session id). Default server-side TTL is **1 hour** (implementation detail). If the Firebase token inclu
  • get_sessions_identity Returns the workspace end-user's **`userId`** and **email** for the authenticated session token. Does not return Firebase UID or session payload. `userId` is a stable, opaque identifier for this person across sessions and logins — it is **not** derived from Firebase. Use it as the correlation key w
  • post_sessions_get_or_create Verifies **Firebase** ID token. If an **active** session already exists for **`(workspaceName, Firebase UID, app_id)`**, returns a new **`sessionToken`** JWT for the **most recently created** matching row (touches activity; does not create a duplicate session). The request **`payload` is ignored on
  • post_sessions_renew_session_token Verifies **Firebase** ID token. Parses **`sessionToken`** path segment as an internal SESSION JWT **without enforcing JWT expiry** (signature and `tokenType=SESSION` are still validated). Loads the session by id from the token subject; the Firebase UID must match the session owner. Increments **`tok
  • post_sessions_set_key Sets a key in the encrypted session payload and returns the updated decrypted payload. If the JSON body is `{ "value": <x> }`, the server unwraps it and stores `<x>` directly. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/set/{key} Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.w
  • get_sessions_get_key Retrieves the decrypted payload value for `key`. **Important:** `404` means the key was never written (normal first-use case). Do not treat as an error. Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/get/{key} Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connec
  • delete_sessions_delete_key Removes `key` from the session payload and returns `true` if the key existed. Source: DELETE /api/v1/sessions/delete/{key} Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dyna
  • post_sessions_revoke Permanently revokes the session referenced by the internal SESSION Bearer token. The session ends and everything stored in it is destroyed and cannot be restored. This is NOT sign-out: to sign a user out and keep their data, use POST /api/v1/auth/logout (or, in a browser, the redirect helper GET /ap
  • auth_session_callback **Browser redirect endpoint** used after hosted `/app/sessions/login`. No `Authorization` header. 1. Verifies **`firebaseToken`** (Firebase ID token). 2. Ensures **`client_redirect_uri`** is allowlisted for **`app_id`** (same rules as `validate-redirect`). 3. **Create vs renew:** If **`session_toke
  • get_auth_logout Browser-friendly logout endpoint for **cross-site** clients (e.g. apps running on `localhost`). Use this as a **top-level navigation** (not XHR/fetch) so `Clear-Site-Data` is applied in a **first-party** context on `secure-flows.com`, making cookie/session clearing reliable even when third-party co
  • post_auth_logout Logs out the current session **without revoking** it. **Browser warning:** calling this endpoint via XHR/fetch from a different origin than `secure-flows.com` is not a reliable way to clear hosted-login cookies. For browser apps (especially localhost), prefer the redirect helper `GET /api/v1/auth/l
  • get_sessions_my Returns a page of sessions for the current user within the current workspace. Self-service dashboard endpoint — requires workspace **`enableSelfService: true`**. Payload is included only for rows whose computed status is active. Sort keys match the admin workspace session list; `pageSize` is clamped
  • post_sessions_revoke_session_id Self-service dashboard endpoint. Revokes a session owned by the caller in the current workspace. The session ends and its stored data is destroyed permanently; this is not sign-out. Requires workspace **`enableSelfService: true`**. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/revoke/{sessionId} Requires `auth.use
  • get_docs_search Embeds the query with Ollama (`nomic-embed-text`) and returns the closest public doc chunks from the environment's search index (pgvector). Source: GET /api/v1/docs/search No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generatin
  • secureflows_build_login_url Builds a correct hosted-login redirect URL. Needs no secureFlows token — safe to call at app-scaffolding time, before any user session exists, which is the phase most secureFlows integration mistakes happen in. Always targets /app/sessions/login (session apps). Never builds the legacy /app/login co
  • secureflows_build_logout_url Builds a correct redirect-logout URL and refuses to build one that violates the two documented logout anti-patterns: a redirect_uri pointing at /callback (SPA callback handlers treat the tokenless return as a failed login and loop), and a redirect_uri that itself embeds session_token (silently renew
  • secureflows_lint_integration Checks source you already generated against the secureFlows integration rules. Needs no secureFlows token; safe at scaffolding time. Pass every auth/session-related file in one call — some checks are evaluated across the whole set. Two kinds of findings: • scope "file" — a forbidden construct

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